The Istanbul Grain File: Documents, the Joint Coordination Centre and What the 2022 Deal Delivered

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was the only arrangement of the Russia–Ukraine war in which Moscow, Kyiv, Ankara and the United Nations jointly ran a working mechanism. Signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022, it let Ukrainian grain, foodstuffs and fertilizer leave three blockaded Black Sea ports under a UN-staffed, Türkiye-hosted inspection regime. About 33 million tonnes moved before Russia declined to extend it on 17 July 2023. Reading the actual documents explains both why the deal worked and why it ended.

This file treats the Initiative as a set of texts and procedures rather than a headline. It covers the legal architecture, the Joint Coordination Centre, the inspection and corridor mechanics, the shipping figures with attribution, the suspension, and how the deal sits beside Türkiye’s other diplomatic tracks.

Background

The Blockade and the Search for a Corridor

Before February 2022, Ukraine was among the world’s leading exporters of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and most of that trade left through Black Sea ports. After Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, commercial shipping from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi effectively stopped. Sea mines, a naval presence and war-risk insurance conditions left tens of millions of tonnes of grain stranded. The FAO Food Price Index reached a record high in March 2022, and importers in the Middle East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa warned of shortages.

The European Union launched its “Solidarity Lanes” in May 2022 to move Ukrainian cargo by rail, road and Danube river routes. These helped but carried only a fraction of pre-war sea volumes. UN Secretary-General António Guterres then put forward a package that linked Ukrainian sea exports with unobstructed Russian food and fertilizer exports. Türkiye offered to host and guarantee the mechanism. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Ankara in June 2022, and a four-party military and technical meeting took place in Istanbul on 13 July 2022.

The Two Documents of 22 July 2022

The deal consists of two linked instruments, signed the same day at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres present.

1. The Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (the Black Sea Grain Initiative). Russia and Ukraine did not sign a bilateral document with each other. Each party’s undertakings were set out in an arrangement concluded with Türkiye and the UN. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov were the principal signatories for their sides. The text covers grain, foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia.
2. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat on promoting access of Russian food products and fertilizers to world markets. In it, the UN undertook to assist with Russian exports, and the dispute over whether this was delivered later became central to Russia’s decision to leave.

The Initiative was valid for 120 days and could be extended automatically unless a party objected. Its stated purpose was humanitarian: to ease global food insecurity and price pressure.

The Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul

The Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was created by the Initiative and began work in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It was staffed by senior representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, and a UN official headed it. Türkiye provided the premises and logistics, and Turkish military and civilian personnel supported daily operations. The JCC’s functions were:

• Registering and approving commercial vessels and agreeing the schedule of movements.
• Organising inspection teams made up of delegates from all four parties.
• Setting the corridor’s coordinates and maintaining communication with the parties’ navies and port authorities.
• Publishing data on cargoes, destinations and ship movements, which became the main public record of the programme.

Decisions were taken by consensus among the four parties, which gave Russia and Ukraine each a practical veto over a vessel’s approval. Critics noted that this gave either side leverage. Supporters said it was the price of a mechanism both belligerents would accept.

Inspection and Corridor Mechanics

The mechanics followed a fixed sequence:

• Registration. Shipowners applied through the JCC. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations reviewed applications for vessel details, crew and intended destination.
• Inbound inspection. Empty vessels heading to Ukrainian ports were inspected near the Istanbul anchorage to confirm that they carried no weapons or military cargo. This inspection was a central Russian security guarantee.
• Transit. Ships passed through the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and Dardanelles), whose passage regime rests on the 1936 Montreux Convention.
• Corridor. Inside the Black Sea, vessels moved through a humanitarian maritime corridor with agreed coordinates. Ukrainian pilots guided ships out of the three ports, and the parties pledged not to attack vessels or port facilities.
• Outbound inspection. Loaded vessels were inspected by JCC teams for cargo conformity and then proceeded to the Straits and onward to their destinations.

The first ship, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022 carrying maize bound for Lebanon. Vessel queues at the Istanbul anchorage grew from late 2022 and through 2023. Kyiv attributed this to slower inspections by the Russian delegation, while Moscow rejected that explanation and pointed to its own export difficulties.

What the Deal Delivered

Figures differ slightly by source and by when they were compiled, so they are attributed here.

The UN and FAO said the additional supply, together with reduced risk premiums, helped bring global food prices down from their March 2022 peak. Russia disputed the humanitarian framing and argued that only a small share of cargo, which it put under 3 percent, reached least developed countries. The UN and Ukraine replied that the programme’s benefit lay in the global price effect and in cargoes bought by humanitarian agencies, and that destination choices were commercial.

Timeline

The 2023 Suspension and End

Russia’s stated reason was that the part of the package concerning its own exports had not been implemented. Moscow listed the reconnection of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) to the SWIFT messaging system, easing of restrictions on insurance, shipping and port access, supplies of agricultural machinery and spare parts, and resumption of the Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline. President Vladimir Putin said Russia would return immediately if these commitments were met. The EU and the United States stated that their sanctions do not target food and fertilizer trade, and that banking and logistics channels remained open in principle. Guterres sent proposals to Moscow in July 2023 aimed at the banking issue.

After 17 July 2023, Russia said ships heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo. Ukraine established its own temporary corridor along the western Black Sea in August 2023 and resumed some exports without the JCC. Putin and Erdoğan discussed reviving the arrangement at their meeting in Sochi on 4 September 2023, where Putin also floated a plan to ship Russian grain via Türkiye for processing and onward supply to poorer countries. The Initiative was not revived.

Key Players & Positions

Ukraine. Kyiv’s official position, set out through its Ministry of Infrastructure and the Presidential Office, is that the Initiative was a necessary humanitarian and economic lifeline, that Russia used it as leverage, and that the corridor should be maintained with or without Russian consent. Ukraine said it wanted exports to continue and accused Moscow of obstructing inspections and then of attacking port infrastructure at Odesa and on the Danube after the lapse.

Russia. Moscow’s position, stated by the Kremlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, is that the Initiative and the UN memorandum were an inseparable package. It argues that the Ukrainian half was implemented while the Russian half was not, and that the Initiative mainly benefited wealthy importers. It also expressed security concerns about the use of the corridor.

United Nations. The Secretary-General and UN agencies describe the Initiative as a successful humanitarian instrument that lowered food prices and moved grain to dozens of countries. They also acknowledge that the Russian memorandum raised difficult issues and that implementation of that track was incomplete. The UN has called for restoration of both tracks.

European Union and United States. Both welcomed the deal and supported the UN effort. They state that their sanctions regimes include exemptions for agricultural trade, and they rejected the claim that sanctions were responsible for Russia’s export difficulties. They have also supported alternative export routes for Ukraine.

Importing and developing countries. African, Middle Eastern and Asian importers, together with FAO and WFP, were the intended beneficiaries. Their official statements mostly urged both sides to keep the corridor operating and keep food outside the war.

Source Comparison

Different source families emphasise different aspects of the same documentary record. The table summarizes the main framings.

Three cautions apply when reading these sources:

• Figures. Totals vary slightly by compilation date. Use the UN JCC data for shipping statistics and Turkish Ministry statements for Ankara’s count, and note which is cited.
• Causality. Statements that the deal alone lowered prices overstate the evidence, since prices also responded to harvests, energy costs and monetary conditions. Statements that it did not matter ignore the record of shipments.
• Documents versus summaries. The text of the Initiative and the UN–Russia memorandum differ in scope, and commentary often merges them. The Doctrine Review explainer sets out how the mechanism operated, and our guide to finding primary sources on Türkiye’s foreign policy shows where to locate the originals.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative. The 22 July 2022 arrangement among Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN for safe export of grain, foodstuffs and fertilizer from Ukrainian ports.
• UN–Russia Memorandum of Understanding. The companion instrument on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. Russia treats it as inseparable from the Initiative.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC). The Istanbul-based body staffed by the four parties that registered ships, ran inspections and coordinated movements.
• Humanitarian maritime corridor. The agreed sea route from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi toward the Turkish Straits, in which the parties pledged not to attack shipping.
• Montreux Convention (1936). The treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Article 19 concerns warships of belligerent states.
• Solidarity Lanes. The EU’s overland and river routes for Ukrainian exports, launched in May 2022.

Related reading on Diplomatic Dossier: How to Verify a Claim About Türkiye’s Foreign Policy, Türkiye’s Gaza Diplomacy on the Record, COP31 in Antalya, Editorial Principles and the Diplomatic Dossier home page.

Perspective Note

Diplomatic Dossier presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked ‘Türkiye’s Position’ reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Diplomatic Dossier presents Türkiye’s official perspective and legal positions alongside the documentary record, and makes this editorial stance transparent to readers. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Diplomatic Dossier Editorial Team